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Abstract
We compare two stylized frameworks for the implementation of monetary policy.
The ￿rst framework relies only on standing facilities, while the second framework relies
only on open market operations. We show that the Friedman rule cannot be imple-
mented when the central bank uses standing facilities, while it can be implemented with
open market operations. For a given rate of in￿ ation, we show that standing facilities
unambiguously achieve higher welfare than just conducting open market operations.
We conclude that elements of both frameworks should be combined. Also, our results
suggest that any monetary policy implementation framework should remunerate both
required and excess reserves.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we compare two frameworks for the implementation of monetary policy. In
the ￿rst framework, the central bank (CB) operates a channel system. In a channel system,
the CB o⁄ers two standing facilities: One lending facility where it stands ready to lend funds
￿We are grateful to Aleks Berentsen, Adrian Peralta-Alva, and two anonymous referees for their com-
ments. The views are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Federal Reserve Banks
of New York or Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. This paper is available free of charge at
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1against collateral and one deposit facility where it accepts and remunerates deposits. The CB
does not intervene in any other way. In a second framework, the CB conducts open market
operations (OMOs), and does not provide access to any standing facilities. Our analysis
allows to clearly identify the cost and bene￿ts of these two polar scenarios and it suggests
ways in which these systems can be combined.
In practice, CBs often adopt a mix of these two approaches but with di⁄erent emphasis.
Some systems rely primarily on the use of standing facilities, while other systems rely on
OMOs and may not provide standing facilities. For example, the Federal Reserve uses OMOs
to implement its monetary policy but does not operate standing facilities. While the discount
window is a source of credit for banks, it is not considered a regular source of funding.1 At the
other end of the spectrum are CBs that run ￿narrow corridors,￿such as the Bank of Canada
or the Reserve Bank of Australia. In such systems, the credit and deposit facilities operated
by the CB play a preeminent role. Our goal is to shed light on some of the welfare costs
and bene￿ts of di⁄erent approaches to implement monetary policy. We are also interested
in monetary policy implementation because the Federal Reserve has received authority to
pay interest on reserves as of October 2008. This authority gives the Federal Reserve the
opportunity to modify the way it implements monetary policy in important ways.2
We base our analysis on a variant of the model of Berentsen and Monnet (2008), hereafter
BM. They use a general equilibrium model that is tractable, as well as provides a rationale for
the use of CB reserves to study the implementation of monetary policy using only standing
facilities (a pure channel system). Modeling the reasons for which agents (or banks) hold
reserves is important because the monetary policy implementation framework modi￿es the
incentives for holding reserves. We depart from BM￿ s assumption that agents pledge goods
as collateral. Instead, we introduce Treasury securities, or government bonds, as eligible
collateral. Agents can exchange reserves for securities, with each other and with the CB, in
a Treasury market.3 This market allows agents to adjust their reserves holdings after they
observe a signal about whether or not they are likely to need reserves. As in BM, we consider
monetary policy implementation systems with a daily reserve maintenance period, in which
the level of required reserves is normalized to zero.
1In December 2007, the Federal Reserve started to provide reserves through a term auction facility to
alleviate some stress in ￿nancial markets. Whether this facility will become a regular tool is not yet clear.
More details are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm.
2See, for example, Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008).
3Note that the money supply, in our model, consists only of CB reserves.
2We obtain two main results. First, a pure channel system is unable to achieve the e¢ cient
allocation. The intuition is simple: In our model with a microfounded role for money, the
lower the in￿ ation rate is, the higher welfare is. However, the rate of in￿ ation is directly
linked to the growth rate of the stock of reserves. A CB that uses a pure channel system can
only control the stock of reserves via the rate it charges at the two standing facilities. If the
lending rate is high, agents have to repay a large amount of interests to the CB. Therefore,
the stock of available reserves shrinks, everything else constant. Naturally, this depends on
agents still borrowing at the lending facility: If agents do not borrow, agents do not repay
interests to the CB and the stock of reserves cannot shrink. As the rate of in￿ ation becomes
su¢ ciently low, the opportunity cost of holding reserves decreases and agents prefer to hold
reserves than using the CB￿ s borrowing facility. This e⁄ect imposes a lower bound on the
growth rate of the supply of reserves, which is necessarily higher than the e¢ cient growth
rate, i.e. the Friedman rule.
Our second result is that the channel system achieves a higher welfare than a system relying
on open market operations, for rates of in￿ ation that can be achieved by both systems. In our
model, agents learn whether they may need reserves in the Treasury market, and an agent￿ s
real value for reserves depends on this information. A property of the e¢ cient allocation (the
￿rst best if there is no in￿ ation above the Friedman rule and the second best otherwise) is
that agents value reserves the same, independently of their information. That is, it is e¢ cient
that they are insured against their information shock in the Treasury market. This means
that agents must be indi⁄erent between holding bonds and reserves in the Treasury market.
With in￿ ation, those agents with no need for reserves, always prefer to hold bonds. This
preference is strict when the central bank conducts open market operations, as there is no
possible insurance mechanism against in￿ ation. Therefore, open market operations cannot
achieve the second best. Surprisingly, this is not the case with the channel system: By paying
an interest on deposits, the CB can actually compensate the cost of in￿ ation for agents who do
not need reserves. Then, these agents can be indi⁄erent between holding bonds and reserves.
However, an interest on deposits is itself in￿ ationary, so that agents who actually need reserves
are hurt. To reduce in￿ ationary pressure, the CB can set the lending rate above the deposit
rate. While agents who use the lending facility pay more, they indirectly bene￿t from this
policy: Since in￿ ation is lower, each dollar they borrow has more value. This policy is feasible
if the lending rate is not too high. Indeed, if it is too high, no agents would use the lending
facility, as they would instead sell all their bonds on the Treasury market. Therefore, when
3the interest rate channel is narrow, i.e., the lending rate is not too high relative to the deposit
rate, agents can be indi⁄erent between holding bonds and reserves in the Treasury market.
To summarize, we obtain our second result because the CB that uses a channel system can
charge di⁄erent interest rates to borrowers and depositors. This essentially create a bene￿cial
transfer from agents who borrow at the CB to depositors. Such a transfer does not exist when
the CB conducts OMOs as it cannot (price) discriminate between borrowers and lenders.
The recent literature on the implementation of monetary policy, as well as the literature
on banks￿reserves management problem initiated by Poole (1968), is mainly con￿ned to
analyzing the issue of monetary policy implementation within a given framework and does
not contrast the performance of di⁄erent systems in welfare terms. For example, the literature
has been concerned with the behavior of the fed funds rate (see for instance Hamilton 1996,
Fur￿ne 1999), or reducing the volatility of the interbank market rates (Whitesell, 2006a,b, and
Holthausen, Monnet and Wuerz, 2007). Woodford (2000) argues that the CB can implement
monetary policy even if it does not have direct control of the money supply. Goodfriend (2002)
proposes a monetary implementation framework in which the CB pays interest on reserves at
the policy rate and expands the supply of reserves considerably. Ennis and Weinberg (2007)
also consider the bene￿ts of paying interest on reserves and the impact it has on daylight
credit in a simple model.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model.
In Section 3 we study an implementation framework that relies on OMOs. In Section 4 we
study an implementation framework that relies on a channel. Section 5 compares the two
frameworks, and Section 6 discusses our results and concludes.
2 The Environment
There is a [0,1] continuum of in￿nitively-lived agents, which we associate with banks, a govern-
ment, and a CB. Time is discrete and three perfectly competitive markets open sequentially
in each period. These markets ￿the Treasury market, the goods market, and the settlement
market ￿are described below. The discount factor is ￿.
The government issues a ￿xed number ￿ B of consols (bonds) with nominal return ~ R per
unit in each period. We assume that these securities are book entry at the CB so that they
are illiquid. The government ￿nances these bonds using lump-sum tax. Since we consider
a stationary environment, we assume that the government adjusts the nominal return to
4in￿ ation, so that the real return is constant.4
In the Treasury market, agents trade securities with each other and, if it is active, with
the CB. At the beginning of this market, each agent receives information regarding their use
of cash. We model this as a preference shock " 2 f0;1g. " = 1 with probability ￿ 2 [0;1].
Agents with " = 0 know they will have no need for cash, while agents with " = 1 are likely
to need some. This di⁄erence in expected need for cash generates an incentive for trading in
the Treasury market.
In the goods market, agents produce or consume a perishable good but cannot trade
securities with the CB or with each other.5 With probability 1 ￿ n, a bank can consume but
cannot produce in the goods market; we refer to these agents as consumers. With probability
n, an agent can produce but cannot consume; we call these agents producers. Consuming
q units of goods in the second market generates utility "u(q), where u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0,
u0(0) = +1 and u0(1) = 0. Producing q units of output has a utility cost c(q) = q. The
￿rst-best allocation in the goods market is denoted q￿ and satis￿es u0(q￿) = 1. All trades
are anonymous and agents￿trading histories are private information. Since producers require
immediate compensation for their production e⁄ort, reserves are essential for trade.6
In the goods market, the CB can operate standing facilities. After agents observe their
idiosyncratic shock, they can either borrow reserves from, or deposit reserves with, the CB.
The CB operates the standing facilities at zero cost. It o⁄ers nominal loans at an interest
rate i‘ and promises to pay interest rate id on nominal deposits, with i‘ ￿ id. This condition
eliminates the possibility for arbitrage in which agents borrow and subsequently make a
deposit at interest id > i‘, increasing their reserves holdings at no cost. We restrict ￿nancial
contracts to overnight contracts. An agent who borrows ‘ units of reserves from the CB repays
(1 + i‘)‘ units at the settlement stage. Similarly, an agent who deposits d units of reserves
at the CB receives (1 + id)d units at the settlement stage. All loans must be secured with
Treasury securities.
In the settlement stage, agents can produce and consume a general good, settle their
claims with the CB, and trade securities with one another or the CB. In addition, agents
and the CB can buy securities from the government. General goods are produced solely from
4See Kocherlakota (2003) or Shi (2005) for a reason why securities should or could be illiquid, respectively.
5We modify this assumption in the Appendix and show that our results are basically unchanged.
6By essential we mean that the use of reserves expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota, 1998 and
Wallace, 2001).
5labor according to a production technology with constant return to scale. Producing one unit
of the consumption good generates one unit of disutility while consuming one unit of it gives
one unit of utility.7
The government levies a (nominal) lump-sum tax during the settlement stage to ￿nance
interest payment on its debt. The CB does not have the authority to tax agents but can
make lump-sum transfers of reserves to agents during the settlement stage. We denote these
(nominal) transfers by ￿ ￿ 0.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the CB operates only a subset of its
monetary policy implementation tools. In the next section, the CB is active only in trading
securities and shuts down access to the standing facilities. In the following section, the CB is
inactive in the Treasury market but provides access to the standing facilities.
2.1 Modeling Choice
Our assumptions on the timing of events are motivated by the CBs￿practice. CBs that rely
primarily on OMOs often intervene in markets early in the morning, before most of the banks￿
payment activity takes place. For instance, in the United States, the Desk at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York conducts its intervention around 10:30 a.m.8 To the contrary,
banks can access standing facilities at any time of the day and even after the money market
is closed. Therefore, banks that are short of reserves but still need to make an unexpected
payment can do so by accessing the lending facility. For instance, Hartmann, Manna, and
Manzanares (2001) report that the euro area money market opens at around 8:00 a.m. and
closes at around 5:45 p.m. Still, banks in the euro area can access the standing facilities at
their National CB until 6:15 p.m., or 15 minutes after TARGET (the euro area Real-Time
Gross Settlement system) closes.
To get to this structure, we assume that, conditional on receiving the signal " = 1, banks
have to make a payment with probability 1 ￿ n, at the end of the day. If they think it is
likely that they will have to make a payment at the end of the day (i.e., they received the
signal " = 1), banks can borrow funds on the Treasury market. Our Treasury market is the
equivalent of a secured interbank market. As is the case in reality, banks can access standing
7The linear preferences in market 1, ￿rst introduced by Lagos and Wright (2005) to get a degenerate
distribution of reserves holdings at the beginning of a period, allow us to interpret transactions that are
taking place in the ￿rst market as settlement transactions, as in Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2008).
8See Edwards (1997) for details.
6facilities even after payments are last made, i.e., even after the goods market closes, while
OMOs are conducted before banks know whether they will have to make a payment, i.e.,
before the ￿nal schock is realized. Still, we show in Section 7.2 in the Appendix, that our
results are robust to a change in the timing of OMOs. We do so by allowing the CB to
intervene in markets after agents have observed their shock. While the equilibrium conditions
are naturally somewhat a⁄ected, our results are unchanged.9
To match some of the important details of a channel system, we assume that banks have
to pledge collateral when they access the lending facility. CBs around the world only extend
collateralized loans, but we keep the reasons for this requirement out of the model. Collateral
requirements impose costs on banks, and in our model with no default risk, it would be
optimal for the CB to make uncollateralized loans. Although we keep default out of the
model, it is relatively easy to integrate it back in: One can think of the discount factor as
integrating a default probability ￿, such that the e⁄ective discount factor is ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ~ ￿ and
~ ￿ is the time discount factor.10
It is also worth discussing why we associate banks with agents in our economy. The basic
idea is that each bank can serve exactly one agent and competition implies that a bank is
maximizing this agent￿ s payo⁄. When agents are in need of cash, the bank accesses the
Treasury market or the standing facilities on behalf of the agent. In this sense, there is
no distinction between what a bank does and what an agent would do. Also, since agents
themselves could access the Treasury market or the standing facilities, there is no essential
role for a ￿bank￿in our model, such as the provision of liquidity insurance as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) for example. Our model is, therefore, not a model of banking, although it still
is a model of monetary policy implementation.11 Introducing the necessary frictions giving
rise to a nontrivial role for banks would add an additional layer of complexity, as banks would
then have to manage an aggregate portfolio of deposits and loans. Monetary policy could only
have a role if the liquidity insurance within the bank is imperfect, that is, if the bank itself
is subject to an aggregate liquidity shock (for instance, withdrawals could be correlated). In
our model, we bypass this di¢ culty as the agent￿ s shock (being a consumer or a producer) is
9One should note that conducting an OMO after the goods market closes is equivalent to opening a deposit
facility. Indeed, after the goods market closes, no bank is interested in obtaining reserves from the CB. Banks
with excess reserves are willing to sell those reserves to the CB at any price corresponding to a gross interest
rate greater than or equal to 1.
10See Chapman, Chiu and Molico (2009) for a model of the channel system with default.
11See Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2009) for a model in which banks are essential.
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Figure 1: Time line with OMOs.
itself the bank￿ s aggregate shock. Needless to say, it would be very interesting to extend the
model to include a nontrivial role for banks, and this is left for future research.
3 Open Market Operations
In this section we study our economy when the CB engages in OMOs in the Treasury market.
Since the CB can print reserves at no cost, it does not face a budget constraint when it
buys securities. However, it cannot sell more securities than what it acquired in the previous
settlement stage. In this section, we assume that the CB does not operate standing facilities.
The time line is, therefore, as in Figure 1.
We use B and b to denote the stock of Treasuries held by the CB and by agents (the
private sector), respectively, at the beginning of the securities market so that ￿ B ￿ B + b.
During the Treasury market, the CB can buy Y securities from the private sector (the usual
convention applies that a negative purchase is a sale). The stock of securities held by the
private sector becomes b0 ￿ b ￿ Y , while the stock of securities held by the CB becomes
B0 = B +Y = ￿ B ￿b0. At the settlement stage, agents get the interest rate on their securities
and the CB makes a lump-sum transfer.
Let m denote an agent￿ s holding of reserves at the beginning of the Treasury market. We
will show that agents choose the same holdings of reserves and securities at the settlement
stage so m and b are identical for all agents. Let M denote the stock of reserves at the
beginning of the Treasury market. The stock of reserves increases by ￿Y if the CB buys Y
securities at a price ￿. Therefore, the stock of reserves at the end of the Treasury market is
given by
M
0 = M + ￿Y:
8Following the settlement stage, the stock of money is
M+ = M
0 + ￿Y
0 ￿ ~ R(B + Y ) + ￿;
where ￿ = ~ R(B + Y )+￿ denotes lump-sum transfers of reserves made by the CB to the agents
and the government. The CB transfers the interests on its bond holdings to the government,
and we assume that the government redistributes it lump-sum to the agents. In addition, the
CB can make an additional transfer of ￿. Y 0 is the amount of securities the CB buys and ￿
the price. Hence, the evolution of the supply of reserves is given by
M+ = M + ￿Y + ￿Y
0 + ￿: (1)
We assume that the CB may not force people to buy the securities it is trying to sell at
a given price. Instead, it determines the amount of securities it wants to buy or sell, taking
the demand schedule for prices ￿ and ￿ into account.
3.1 Equilibrium
We solve the equilibrium backward, ￿rst considering the settlement stage, then the goods
market trades, and ￿nally the Treasury market. In period t, let ￿t be the real price of
reserves in the settlement stage. We focus on symmetric and stationary equilibriums in which
all agents follow identical strategies and where real allocations are constant over time. For
notational simplicity we suppress the time index t and consider a representative period t. In
a stationary equilibrium end-of-period real reserves balances are time invariant
￿M = ￿+M+: (2)
De￿ne the growth rate of the money supply, i.e., in￿ ation, as ￿ ￿ M+=M = ￿=￿+. We let
V (m;b) denote the expected value of entering the settlement stage with m units of reserves
and b securities. Z(m;b) denotes the expected value of entering the Treasury market with
m units of reserves and b securities. During the Treasury market, agents reallocate their
portfolio based on the information they have about their type in the goods market. W (m;b)
denotes the expected value of entering the goods market with a portfolio (m;b).
93.1.1 Settlement Stage
In the settlement stage, the problem of an agent with portfolio (m;b) is:
V (m;b) = max
h;m+;b+
￿h + ￿Z (m+;b+)
s:t: ￿m+ + ￿￿b+ = h + ￿(m ￿ T) + ￿
￿
￿ + ~ R
￿
b + ￿￿:
where h is hours worked in the settlement stage. Using the budget constraint to eliminate h
in the objective function, one obtains the ￿rst-order conditions
￿Zm+ = ￿; (3)
￿Zb+ ￿ ￿￿( = if b+ > 0); (4)
where Zm+ ￿
@Z(m+;b+)
@m+ , and Zb+ ￿
@Z(m+;b+)
@b+ , are the marginal value of taking an additional
unit of reserves, and securities, into the Treasury market, respectively. Since the marginal
disutility of working is 1, ￿￿ is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of reserves in the
settlement stage and ￿￿￿ is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of securities in the settlement
market. The implication of (3) and (4) is that all agents enter the following period with the
same amount of reserves and the same quantity of securities (which can be zero). The envelope
conditions are
Vm = ￿ and Vb = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
: (5)
where Vj is the partial derivative of V (m;b) with respect to j = m;b.
Market clearing also requires that
B + Y + Y
0 = ￿ B ￿ b+: (6)
3.1.2 Treasury Market
In the Treasury market, agents receive their idiosyncratic shock ", indicating whether they
will need cash in the next market. Those with a shock " = 0 know that they will have no
use for cash, and they may wish to buy bonds instead of holding onto their cash until the
next settlement stage. Those with a shock " = 1 know that there is some chance that they
will need cash to consume. Therefore, they may opt for selling bonds. ￿ denotes the market
clearing price. An agent￿ s expected lifetime utility when entering the Treasury market with








10where y", the quantity of Treasuries bought in the market depending on ", is chosen optimally
























b = 0: (7)
Since u0 (0) = +1, no agent with " = 1 will leave the Treasury market without reserves,
because there is no other opportunity to get reserves in the goods market in this system.
Therefore, ￿
1
m = 0. To the contrary, agents with " = 0 derive no utility from cash purchase





b = 0, we can use (7) to ￿nd an expression for the marginal value of securities
when entering the Treasury market













m + (1 ￿ ￿)W
0
b : (9)
An additional unit of securities in the Treasury market allows agents to acquire additional
reserves at a price ￿. Also, since ￿
1










Clearly, by combining (9) and (10), we obtain an arbitrage condition that must hold for agents
to be willing to hold both cash and securities, ￿Zm = Zb. Market clearing requires that
(1 ￿ ￿)y
0 + ￿y
1 + Y = 0: (11)
3.1.3 Goods Market
After the Treasury market, agents receive idiosyncratic shocks that determine whether they
are consumers or producers (whether they have a high or a low need for reserves) as they
enter the goods market. An agent who received shock " is a consumer with probability 1￿n
and a producer with probability n. The expected payo⁄ of an agent " and portfolio (m;b) is
W
" (m;b) = (1 ￿ n)W
";c (m;b) + nW
";p (m;b): (12)
11Let q and q"
p denote the quantities consumed and produced in the goods market by agents
who received shock ", respectively (only those agents with " = 1 consume and q denotes their













Using (5), the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
p￿ = 1: (13)
Hence, those agents are indi⁄erent as to the amount they produce and we will just assume
that q1
p = q0
p = qp, where market clearing requires qp = (1 ￿ n)￿q=n. The marginal value of
reserves and securities for producers in the goods market are respectively,
W
";p
m = Vm = ￿ and W
";p
b = Vb = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
: (14)
A producer will only be able to use his reserves in the settlement stage, hence the value of
reserves is the same in the goods market as it is in the next settlement stage. This is also
true of the marginal value of securities. An agent with " = 0 will never consume so that
W 0;c(m;b) = V (m;b). However a consumer solves the following problem:
W
1;c(m;b) = max
q u(q) + V (m ￿ pq;b)
s.t. pq ￿ m:
Let ￿￿ ￿
1
m denote the real Lagrange multiplier of this type￿ s budget constraint. Using (5) and
(13), the ￿rst-order conditions can be written as
u
0(q) = 1 + ￿ ￿
1
m: (15)
If the budget constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1, which means trades are ine¢ cient. Other-
wise, trades are e¢ cient. Using the envelope theorem and (15), the marginal value of reserves









The marginal value of reserves has a straightforward interpretation. A consumer with an
additional unit of reserves acquires 1=p units of goods yielding additional utility u0(q)=p.
12However, the value of bringing an additional security is the same as the value of this security







~ R + ￿
￿
: (17)
Combining (12), (14), and (16), the marginal values of reserves in the goods market for an
agent with shock " 2 f0;1g are,
W
1
m = (1 ￿ n)￿u
0(q) + n￿; (18)
W
0
m = ￿: (19)
3.1.4 Symmetric Stationary Equilibrium
Combining (10) and (18)-(19) we obtain
Zm(m;b) = ￿[(1 ￿ n)￿u
0(q) + n￿] + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿




The marginal value of cash in the Treasury market has two parts. First, an additional unit
of cash can be used to purchase 1=￿ units of bonds promising a real return ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
in the
next settlement stage. Agents with " = 0 prefer this option. Second, an additional unit of
cash can be used in the goods market by consumers to purchase 1=p = ￿ units of goods with
a marginal value u0 (q), or it can be held onto the next settlement stage by producers with a
real return of ￿. Agents with " = 1will prefer this option. Equation (3) can be rewritten as
Zm = ￿￿1=￿. Also, in a stationary equilibrium ￿ = ￿￿1=￿. Therefore, using (20) we obtain
￿
￿
= ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0(q) + n] + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




On the left-hand side of (21) is the real marginal cost of holding cash across periods, i.e., the
in￿ ation rate. On the right-hand side is the real marginal bene￿t from an additional unit of
cash. Equations (4) and (8) give a no arbitrage condition
￿ ￿ ￿￿:
In other words, it must cost more to acquire bonds in the previous period than the price at
which they can be sold in the Treasury market. Since we consider a stationary equilibrium
13and the amount of bonds available in the economy is constant, we have ￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿, so that
we must have
￿￿ ￿ ￿:













b ￿ 0, if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿). In other words, if consumers are constrained,
bonds carry a liquidity premium, as they are worth more than their intrinsic value, i.e., the
discounted stream of their payments ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿). Similarly, we have
￿
0
m = ~ R + ￿ ￿ ￿;
and ￿
0
m > 0 if and only if ~ R + ￿ > ￿. That is, producers will naturally choose to spend all
their cash acquiring bonds if they are cheap relative to their return. Therefore, we obtain
y
0 = m=￿, if ~ R + ￿ > ￿;
y










Finally, the market clearing condition for bonds on the settlement market is
Y + Y
0 = ￿ B ￿ B ￿ b+ = b ￿ b+:
and so
b+ = b ￿ (Y + Y
0):
Therefore we can de￿ne an equilibrium with OMOs as follows.
De￿nition 1 Given the CB policy (￿;B;Y=M;Y 0=M), a symmetric stationary equilibrium is
a list (￿;q;￿;￿) that solves












= ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0(q) + n] + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




￿ = ￿￿; (24)
14where
y
0 = m=￿, if ~ R + ￿ > ￿;
y










In the Appendix, we characterize four types of equilibrium, which depend on the agents￿
desire to hold bonds. More precisely, let ￿" be the real return on cash for agents with a shock
" and let ￿ be the real return on collateral, as evaluated in the Treasury market. Intuitively,
in any equilibrium cash has relatively more value for those agents with " = 1, or ￿1 ￿ ￿0.
Also in any equilibrium, there must be a positive demand and a positive supply of bonds in
the Treasury market. This implies that cash must have a higher value than bonds for those
agents with " = 1 and inversely for agents with " = 0, or ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0. Finally, we can rewrite
(23) as ￿=￿ = ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿.12
3.2 Welfare with Open Market Operations
Given a real allocation q and zb, we show in the Appendix that welfare is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)W = (1 ￿ n)[u(q) ￿ q]:
The problem of the CB is to choose Y and Y 0 so as to maximize the welfare function, given
the implied allocation is an equilibrium. q￿ denotes the e¢ cient allocation. In the Appendix,
we show the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose M0 ￿ B0￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿), then the e¢ cient allocation q￿ is an equilib-
rium allocation with OMOs.
The equilibrium implementing the e¢ cient allocation q￿ requires a su¢ ciently large initial
stock of bonds relative to the money supply, or M0 ￿ B0￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿). In this equilibrium,
bonds are as liquid as cash, and agents are indi⁄erent as to which asset to hold in the Treasury
market, or ￿1 = ￿ = ￿0. Not surprisingly, this is the case if the Friedman rule hold ￿ = ￿.
The CB implements this equilibrium by selling bonds in the Treasury market to pump money
12The four types of equilibrium are de￿ned by the four cases ￿1 = ￿ = ￿0, ￿1 = ￿ > ￿0, ￿1 > ￿ = ￿0; and
￿1 > ￿ > ￿0.
15out of the system at the rate ￿. The condition M0 ￿ B0￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿) can be restated as
M0 ￿ ￿B0 where ￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿). It says that the cash value of outstanding bonds must
be higher than the stock of cash, when bonds are fairly priced. This condition ensures that
the CB can implement the Friedman rule, ￿ = ￿, by selling enough bonds in the Treasury
market. In this equilibrium, ￿1 = ￿ = ￿0 and bonds do not carry a liquidity premium.
We supposed so far that the CB could retain the pro￿t from selling its securities. Suppose
that this is no longer the case. Then it must be that ￿ ￿ 1. In this case what is the best
feasible policy? We show the following result in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose the CB cannot retain pro￿t, then ￿ = 1 and the best equilibrium
allocation with OMOs satis￿es
￿ [(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n] = 1: (25)
In all possible equilibria, welfare is decreasing in ￿. As in￿ ation rises, cash loses its value
and producers are unwilling to produce as much. Therefore, when the CB cannot retain
pro￿t, it can only reach a second best equilibrium, one in which the CB implements the
lowest possible level of in￿ ation, here ￿ = 1. In this equilibrium, since there is some in￿ ation
(relative to the Friedman rule) those agents with " = 0prefer to hold bonds over cash so
that ￿ > ￿0. Given this, the best equilibrium is the one that minimizes distortion for agents
with " = 1. In￿ ation￿ s distortions in the goods market cannot be eliminated with monetary
policy, since there is no possibility for OMOs there.13 Hence, the budget constraint will bind
for consumers. However distortions in the Treasury market can be eliminated for agents with
" = 1. In particular, " = 1 agents can be indi⁄erent between holding bonds and cash, or
￿1 = ￿, so that their short-selling constraint is not binding. In this case, we obtain, using
￿=￿ = ￿￿1+(1 ￿ ￿)￿, that ￿1 = 1=￿, which is condition (25). Hence, in the Treasury market,
the discounted marginal value of cash for " = 1 agents equals their marginal cost (all in real
terms). An example of policy that implements ￿ = 1 is one of pure repos, or Y = ￿Y 0.
4 Channel System
In this section, we study an implementation framework that relies solely on standing facilities.
We assume that the CB does not conduct OMOs. When ￿ = 1, the result above shows that
13We relax this assumption in Section 7.2 in the Appendix. There, we show that a CB that conducts OMOs
can provide some insurance against in￿ ation, as the best achievable allocation satis￿es u0 (q) = 1=￿.
16this is without loss of generality.
This framework is very similar to the model studied in BM￿ s 2008 paper. However, to make
a legitimate comparison with OMOs, we modify BM￿ s model in one important dimension.
They assume that agents can produce at a cost an asset bearing a real and exogenous return,
similar to a Lucas tree. In this paper, instead, we study the channel system under the
assumption that agents must pledge bonds as collateral in order to borrow from the CB.
In the channel system, agents can access the CB￿ s lending and deposit facilities after they
observe their idiosyncratic shock on the goods market. The CB operates the standing facilities
at zero cost, o⁄ers nominal loans ‘ at an interest rate i‘, and promises to pay interest rate
id on nominal deposits d with i‘ ￿ id. This condition eliminates the possibility for arbitrage
where agents borrow and subsequently make a deposit at interest id > i‘, thus increasing
their reserves holdings at no cost. We restrict ￿nancial contracts to overnight contracts. An
agent who borrows ‘ units of reserves from the CB repays (1 + i‘)‘ units of reserves at the
settlement stage. Similarly, an agent who deposits d units of reserves at the CB receives
(1 + id)d units of reserves at the settlement stage. We assume that all loans must be secured
with Treasury securities. In a channel system, the stock of reserves evolves endogenously as
follows
M+1 = M ￿ i‘L + idD + ￿; (26)
where M denotes the per capita stock of reserves at the beginning of period t, and ￿ is a lump-
sum transfer of reserves to agents. In the settlement stage, total loans L are repaid. Since
interest rate payments by the agents are i‘L, the stock of reserves shrinks by this amount.
Interest payments by the CB on total deposits are idD. The CB simply prints additional
reserves to make these interest payments; therefore the stock of reserves increases by this
amount. Note that since the CB does not hold any Treasury securities, and as the return on
Treasury securities is ￿nanced via lump-sum taxes on agents, the supply of reserves is not
a⁄ected by the outstanding amount or the rate of return on securities. The time line then is
as in Figure 2.
17Settlement stage Goods market Treasury market
Consumer/Producer shocks
T-sec. traded T-sec. traded
Goods traded ) , ( + + b m Goods traded
Signals on pref.
Access to standing facilities
Figure 2: Time line with standing facilities.
4.1 Settlement Stage
In the ￿rst market, the problem of a representative agent is:
V (m;b;‘;d) = max
h;m+;b+
￿h + ￿Z (m+;b+)
s:t: ￿m+ + ￿￿b+ = h + ￿(m ￿ T) + ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
b + ￿(1 + id)d ￿ ￿(1 + i‘)‘ + ￿￿:
The ￿rst-order conditions are
￿Zm+ ￿ ￿ ( = if m+ > 0 ); (27)
￿Zb+ ￿ ￿￿ ( = if b+ > 0 ): (28)
Once again, we focus on equilibriums in which m > 0. The implication of (27) and (28) is
that all agents exit the settlement stage with the same portfolio of reserves and securities
(which can be zero). The envelope conditions are
Vm = ￿;Vb = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
;V‘ = ￿￿(1 + i‘);Vd = ￿(1 + id); (29)
where Vj is the partial derivative of V (m;b;‘;d) with respect to j = m;b;‘;d.
4.2 Treasury Market
The Treasury market functions as in the previous section. In particular, the ￿rst-order con-









b = 0: (30)
Since agents can obtain reserves from the standing facility, an agent with " = 1 may choose
to leave this market with no cash. It can also be the case that agents with " = 0 leave the










b = 0. So that we still obtain
Zb (m;b) = ￿￿W
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Market clearing requires that
(1 ￿ ￿)y
0 + ￿y
1 = 0: (33)
4.3 Goods Market
As in the previous section, at the beginning of the goods market, agents receive idiosyncratic
shocks that determine whether they have a high or a low need for reserves. We let q" and
q"
s, respectively, denote the quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller in the




s), respectively, denote the loan obtained and the amount
of reserves deposited by a buyer (seller) in the goods market. An agent who has m reserves
and b securities at the opening of the goods market has an expected lifetime utility
W
"(m;b) = (1 ￿ n)["u(q




























b are chosen optimally as follows.
Agents with " = 0 never consume so that q0 = 0. Then let q1 = q. Agents with a high
need for reserves never deposit reserves with the CB and those with a low need for reserves
never take out loans but deposit all their reserves. Therefore d1
b = 0 and ‘1
b = ‘"
s = 0 for
" = 0;1. To simplify the notation, let ‘ ￿ ‘1
b and d" ￿ d"
s. Accordingly, we get
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s, q;‘, and db;d" solve the following optimization problems.
19The problem of producers is maxqs;d [￿qs + V (m + pqs ￿ d;b;0;d)] s.t. m + pqs ￿ d ￿ 0.
Using (29), the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
p￿ + p￿￿d = 1; (34)
id = ￿d; (35)
where ￿￿d is the multiplier on the deposit constraint. The two conditions can be combined
to get
p￿(1 + id) = 1: (36)
Comparing (13) and (36) we can already observe one major di⁄erence between OMOs and
a system relying on standing facilities. With standing facilities, the deposit facility makes
money more valuable as depositor earn interest on their deposit. Therefore, ceteris paribus,




u(q) + V (m ￿ pq + ‘;b;‘;0)
s.t. pq ￿ m + ‘ and ‘ ￿ ￿ ‘;
where
￿ ‘ ￿ ( ~ R + ￿)b=(1 + i‘) (37)
is the maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the CB, as b units of Treasury securities
become ( ~ R + ￿)b units of reserves at the beginning of the settlement market. Finally, the
securities must also cover the interest payment. Using (29), consumers￿￿rst-order conditions
can be written as
u
0(q) = p￿(1 + ￿q); (38)
￿q = ￿‘ + i‘; (39)
where ￿￿q is the multiplier on a consumer￿ s budget constraint and ￿￿‘ is the one on the
borrowing constraint. Using (36) and combining (38) and (39) yields
u
0(q) =
1 + i‘ + ￿‘
1 + id
: (40)
14This result is similar to the one in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007).
20If the borrowing constraint is not binding and the CB sets i‘ = id, trades are e¢ cient. If the
borrowing constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1, which means trades are ine¢ cient even when




m = (1 ￿ n)u
0(q)=p + n￿(1 + id); and (41)
W
0
m = ￿(1 + id): (42)
Note that the standing facility increases these marginal values because agents can earn interest





















~ R + ￿
￿
: (44)
4.4 Symmetric Stationary Equilibrium
First we show that the equilibrium price 1=￿ in the Treasury market is bounded above by
(1 + i‘)=( ~ R + ￿) and below by (1 + id)=( ~ R + ￿).
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium
1 + i‘ ￿
~ R + ￿
￿
￿ 1 + id. (45)
Proof. Suppose ( ~ R + ￿)=[￿ (1 + i‘)] > 1. This means that with one unit of reserves, agents
with " = 1 are able to purchase 1=￿ bonds, which allows them to borrow ( ~ R+￿)=[￿ (1 + i‘)] >
1 units of reserves from the CB. In addition, those agents who do not need to borrow get
( ~ R + ￿)=￿ ￿ 1 next period and are, therefore, willing to purchase bonds. But this implies
that all agents want to buy bonds, and this cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose now ( ~ R +
￿)=[￿ (1 + id)] < 1, then all agents would sell bonds to acquire reserves, since they would
obtain at least ￿ (1 + id) amount of reserves by using the deposit facility, higher than the
bond return ~ R + ￿. This again cannot constitute an equilibrium.
Notice that ( ~ R + ￿)=￿ ￿ 1 + id implies that " = 0-agents will bring some bonds over to
the goods market, so that their short-selling constraint on securities cannot possibly bind in
21the Treasury market, i.e., ￿
0
b = 0. Similarly, ( ~ R+￿)=￿ ￿ 1+i‘ implies that agents with " = 1
will bring cash to the goods market, so that their cash short-selling constraint cannot bind,
i.e., ￿
1
m = 0. Therefore, the above argument validates (32) and (31) as equilibrium equations.
We now solve for the quantities traded in the Treasury market. Using (30), we obtain
that ￿￿
1
b = ￿W 1
m ￿ W 1
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b ￿ 0, if and only if ￿ ￿ ( ~ R + ￿)￿
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. This liquidity premium depends on whether agents are con-
strained in the goods market. If agents are severely constrained, then the liquidity premium
is high by (40). If agents are not constrained, then bonds do not carry any liquidity premium.
Therefore, agents with " = 1 are indi⁄erent between holding bonds or cash whenever the bond
price perfectly re￿ ects the intrinsic value plus the liquidity premium. In this case, ￿
1
b = 0,
i.e., their constraint on the Treasury market does not bind.
We now solve for ￿
0
m to analyze cases in which " = 0-agents are constrained on the Treasury
market. From (30) we obtain that ￿￿
0
m = W 0
b ￿ ￿W 0






m = ~ R + ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + id);
so that ￿
0
m ￿ 0, if and only if
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿ ￿ 1+id. That is, " = 0-agents are cash constrained
if bonds return more than depositing cash with the CB. Therefore, we have the following
equilibrium relations
y
0 = m=￿, if ~ R + ￿ > ￿ (1 + id); (46)
y
1 = ￿b, if ￿ > ( ~ R + ￿)￿
￿









0 = (1 ￿ ￿)y
0 + ￿y
1: (48)
The money supply evolves according to (26), which can be simpli￿ed to15







15See the Appendix for details.
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￿ b( ~ R + ￿)=(1 + i‘): (50)




= ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n](1 + id) + (1 ￿ ￿)
~ R + ￿
￿
: (51)
Finally, (31) and (32) give us the no arbitrage condition
￿￿ = ￿: (52)
De￿nition 5 A symmetric stationary equilibrium is a policy (￿;id;i‘) and a time-invariant
list (￿;q;‘=M;￿;￿) satisfying (45)-(52).
In the Appendix, we show the following result.
Proposition 6 The ￿rst best q￿ is not an equilibrium allocation of any channel system.
This result has a simple intuition: at the e¢ cient allocation, cash has a lower value
than bonds on the Treasury market and, therefore, all agents would demand bonds. To
understand why this is the case, notice that q￿ is an equilibrium allocation if consumers are
unconstrained and i‘ = id. When i‘ = id, the cost of borrowing at the CB for consumers
is exactly compensated by the extra quantity that sellers are willing to produce, since they
themselves earn interests on their deposits. This implies that ￿ = 1 + id ￿ 1, as de￿ ation
otherwise requires i‘ > id. As consumers are unconstrained in the goods market, it must
be that agents with " = 1 have enough bonds on the Treasury market to acquire the cash
they may need. Therefore, bonds are priced at their fair value in the settlement stage, i.e.,
￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿). However, this means that the return from bonds in the Treasury market ￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿ = (1 + id)=￿ is higher than the return from cash in the goods market, which is
1+id, given the equilibrium allocation is q￿. This obviously cannot be an equilibrium, because
all agents would prefer to buy bonds than to hold onto cash.
4.5 No Lending Facility
To understand the equilibrium with lending facility, it is ￿rst instructive to study the case in
which the CB does not o⁄er any lending facility but only a deposit facility and set ￿ = 0.
Then (46)-(48) become
23y
0 = m=￿, if ~ R + ￿ > ￿ (1 + id); (53)
y







Notice that the absence of a lending facility reduces the value of holding collateral for agents
with " = 1. Therefore, their short-selling constraint binds for lower values of ￿ than in the
case with a lending facility. Since ‘ = 0, (26) becomes
￿ = 1 + id: (56)
The equilibrium conditions (51) and (52) remain unchanged.
We have the following result, the proof of which is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 7 With no lending facility, the best feasible equilibrium allocation satis￿es
￿ [(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n] = 1: (57)
In an economy with no lending facility, a CB has no possibility to reduce the money supply.
However, since in￿ ation is perfectly correlated with the interest rate on deposits, ￿ = 1 + id,
(36) implies that the deposit rate exactly o⁄sets the e⁄ects of in￿ ation in the goods market.
Hence, whether the CB chooses id > 0 or sets id = 0 does not modify the goods market
allocation q. However, as there is in￿ ation, agents with " = 0, prefer to hold bonds to cash,
so that ￿ > v0. When bonds are priced at their fair value, the short-selling constraint on
the Treasury market is not binding as bonds and cash for " = 1 agents bear the same rate
of return, i.e., v1 = ￿. We can show that such an equilibrium exists and the consumption
allocation is given by (57). Notice that this allocation is the same as the one de￿ned by (25).
Hence, a channel system with no lending facility can achieve the same allocations as a system
with only OMOs. Also, absent any lending facility, the CB cannot insure agents against the
shock they receive in the goods market: Had they known in the Treasury market, agents who
do not need cash in the goods market, would have preferred to sell all their bonds, as ￿ > v0.
4.6 Lending Facility
In the previous sections, we showed that 1) a channel system cannot implement the ￿rst best
allocations and 2) a channel system cannot do better than OMOs when the CB uses only a
24deposit facility. In this section, we consider the case in which the CB o⁄ers a lending and a
deposit facility but has to redistribute any pro￿t lump-sum. In other words, we require ￿ ￿ 1.
We show the following result.
Proposition 8 Suppose ￿ B0=M0 is high enough, then there is an equilibrium in a channel
system with i‘ > id and where q is such that
(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n < 1=￿:
The equilibrium that we consider is one in which " = 1-agents are indi⁄erent between
holding bonds and cash in the Treasury market, consumers are unconstrained when they
borrow at the lending facility, and in￿ ation is lower than 1+id. Indeed, when agents borrow
at the CB, ￿ < 1+id, as interests on loans i‘L now reduce the stock of money in circulation.
However, there is borrowing at the CB only if agents hold collateral. Hence, agents with
" = 1 access the lending facility, only if they are unconstrained on the Treasury market. This
implies that v1 = ￿, where v1 = [(1 ￿ n)u0 (q) + n](1 + id) and ￿ = ( ~ R + ￿)=￿.
Since agents are unconstrained at the lending facility, bonds do not carry any liquidity
premium. Therefore, bonds must be priced at fair value: ￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿) which implies
( ~ R + ￿)=￿ = ￿=￿. In other words, the bonds return equals the cash return. The marginal
value of cash must, however, be equal to its marginal cost on the settlement stage, so that
(51) applies. Since v1 = ￿, we obtain that
￿
￿
= [(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n](1 + id)
and since the lending facility reduce in￿ ation below 1 + id, we obtain that consumption can
increase above the level that we obtain when there is no lending facility. In other words,
paying interest on deposits makes consumers better o⁄ if in￿ ation is lower than the deposit
rate: Then in￿ ation does not erode all the bene￿ts of using the deposit facility. In￿ ation is
reduced whenever consumers access the lending facility at a higher rate than the deposit rate.
Why can agents consume the amount q such that u0 (q) = (1 + i‘)=(1 + id) > 1? When
agents pledge one unit of collateral at the lending facility, (37) implies that they obtain
( ~ R + ￿)=(1 + i‘) units of cash. With it, (36) implies that they can purchase 1=p = ￿(1 + id)
units of goods. Hence, one additional unit of collateral at the lending facility has a value
u0 (q)￿(1 + id)
h
( ~ R + ￿)=(1 + i‘)
i
. If agents do not borrow, then they just get the return from
the collateral ￿( ~ R+￿). When consumers are unconstrained, they are indi⁄erent between the
25two options (accessing or not accessing the lending facility), so that u0 (q)(1 + id)=(1 + i‘) =
1.
In the Appendix, we also show that this equilibrium exists if the stock of bonds is high
enough (justifying why the collateral constraint does not bind). Notice that we need that
bonds are priced at their fair value and do not carry any liquidity premium. This is only
the case when consumers are unconstrained on the goods market, while still borrowing at the
CB. This is crucial, since this implies that there is lower in￿ ation in this environment than
in the case with no lending facility. Indeed, absent any lending facility we had v1 = ￿ > v0.
However, introducing lending facilities allows a reduction in in￿ ation relative to the deposit
rate, which increases v0. By chosing the correct combination of interest rate, the CB can
fully insures agents against their shocks, in the sense that v1 = ￿ = v0. This is achieved by
charging borrowers a larger interest than the deposit rates. While the borrowers are a-priori
worse-o⁄, they actually bene￿t from this policy as it lowers in￿ ation, which increases the
value of cash. The fact that the CB can increase v0 by increasing the lending rate resembles
a transfer from consumers to those agents who do not need cash.







￿ (1 ￿ n)
;
and the lending rate cannot be too high, i.e., it is optimal that the CB implements a narrow
channel.
5 Discussion
In this section, we compare the two implementation frameworks studied in the paper. We
are interested in these systems￿e⁄ectiveness in implementing the Friedman rule and in the
welfare they yield for an exogenously ￿xed rate of growth of the supply of reserves.
5.1 Implementation of the Friedman Rule
The welfare maximizing allocation, q￿, can be achieved when monetary policy is implemented
with OMOs and the CB sells bonds so as to contract the money supply according to the
Friedman rule. However, this allocation cannot be implemented in a channel system. Hence,
ideally implementing monetary policy using OMOs is better than using a channel system.
26It is interesting to understand why the Friedman rule cannot be implemented in a channel
system. Some insight can be gained by looking at the equations governing the evolution of
the supply of reserves in both systems. When the CB uses OMOs, the supply of reserves
evolves according to
M+ = M ￿ ￿Y ￿ ￿Y
0:
Hence, if Y 0 = 0, the supply of reserves can shrink when Y is set appropriately. This is not
the case however when the CB uses a channel system. In this case, the supply of reserves
evolves according to
M+ = M ￿ i‘L + idD;
where L and D are total loans and deposits respectively. Notice that the only way to imple-
ment the Friedman rule is to set i‘ > id high enough so as to shrink the supply of reserves.
This obviously implies a cost on borrowers. However, reserves are costless to hold when the
Friedman rule is in place. Therefore, if the Friedman rule is implemented, there will be no
borrowing at the standing facility if the CB charges a positive interest rate and, as a conse-
quence, the supply of reserves cannot shrink. This limits the ability of the CB to increase the
rate of return on money, thereby making it impossible to implement the Friedman rule.
5.2 Welfare with a Given In￿ ation Rate
In this section, we consider which framework yields higher welfare for an exogenously given
level of in￿ ation. First, we de￿ne a feasible level of in￿ ation under each system: ￿ is a feasible
level of in￿ ation under a given monetary policy implementation framework if there exists a
monetary policy under that framework that can achieve ￿. We o⁄er the following result.
Proposition 9 If ￿ < ￿ ￿, then ￿ is OMO-feasible but not channel-feasible. For all ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿,
welfare is higher when ￿ is implemented using a channel system.
If a channel system can implement a given level of in￿ ation, then this system is preferable
to OMOs. The intuition is rather simple. Producers are willing to produce more goods for a
given amount of cash since they can earn interest on their pro￿t by using the deposit facility.
However, as we showed in sections 4.5 and 4.6, this is not enough for standing facilities to be
better than OMOs. In addition to the deposit facility, agents should have access to a lending
facility that imposes a higher interest rate i‘ > id. By treating borrowers and depositors
asymmetrically, a lending facility can perform a transfer from banks that need cash to those
27that use the deposit facility. This transfer improves welfare, since it allows lower in￿ ation and
additional production (since in￿ ation is lower). If there is no lending facility, or if the standing
facilities treat agents symmetrically i‘ = id, the interest rate paid on a deposit facility is equal
to in￿ ation and standing facilities cannot do better than OMOs.
5.3 Policy Implications
The results above suggest that an optimal system of implementation of monetary policy
should include some elements of both of the pure systems we have studied in this paper. If
it wants to achieve in￿ ation rates that are su¢ ciently low, a CB operating a channel system
may need to hold a portfolio of securities and make OMO to a⁄ect the evolution of the supply
of reserves. Conversely, a CB implementing monetary policy using OMO may want to pay
interest on reserves to moderate some of the distortions that arise away from the Friedman
rule.
This result is relevant for an important policy question in the United States. In October
2008, the Federal Reserve received the authority to pay interest on reserves. This was mo-
tivated in part by the ￿nancial crisis that started in 2007, and which has greatly in￿ uenced
monetary policy and its implementation. Once the crisis subsides, the Federal Reserve will
have a new tool at its disposal. In the implementation framework of the Federal Reserve prior
to the authorization to pay interest on reserves, banks were required to hold reserves against a
fraction of their deposits and neither required nor excess reserves were remunerated. This led
to a couple of potential distortions. On the one hand, banks did expend resources in an e⁄ort
to minimize their reserves requirement. One manifestation of such e⁄orts was the creation
of sweep accounts.16 On the other hand, taking the requirement as given, banks tried to
minimize the amount of reserves they held above their requirement since such reserves were
costly at the margin.
As noted by Vice Chairman Kohn in a testimony to Congress before the new law was
passed, ￿The Board has long supported legislation that would authorize the Federal Reserve
to pay depository institutions interest on the balances they hold at Reserve Banks. As
we previously have testi￿ed, paying interest on required reserve balances would remove a
substantial portion of the incentive for depositories to engage in reserve avoidance measures,
16A sweep account transfers funds from deposit accounts, against which the banks would have to hold
reserves, into another account against which no reserves need to be held at the end of each day. This allows
the bank to minimize the amount of reserves it must hold.
28and the resulting improvements in e¢ ciency should eventually be passed through to bank
borrowers and depositors. Having the authority also to pay interest on contractual clearing
and excess reserve balances as well as required reserves would enhance the Federal Reserve￿ s
ability to e¢ ciently conduct monetary policy.￿ 17
In our model, there are no reserve requirements, since all reserves held are excess reserves.
An agent who is a producer is in a similar position to a bank holding excess reserves. Our
analysis implies that this is suboptimal as it may distort the agent￿ s incentives. In particular,
our analysis provides support for the argument that it may be optimal for the Federal Reserve
System to pay interest on both required and excess reserves.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies two stylized implementation frameworks for monetary policy. In one case,
the CB only relies on OMOs, while in the other case, the CB operates standing facilities. In
our environment, holding reserves is costly if the CB does not implement the Friedman rule.
The implementation frameworks can reduce this cost in di⁄erent ways.
If the CB can keep its pro￿ts, then OMOs can achieve the Friedman rule and thus the
e¢ cient allocation. However, this is not the case if the CB must rebate all its pro￿ts, for
example to a ￿scal authority. To the contrary, standing facilities cannot implement the
Friedman rule. To reach the Friedman rule, the CB must be able to shrink the money supply
su¢ ciently. With only standing facilities, this can be achieved only if banks use the lending
facility and the CB￿ s lending rate is higher than the deposit rate. However, if the rate of growth
of the money supply is low enough, agents will prefer to hold money, rather than the bonds.
This is because the opportunity cost of holding money, in terms of foregone interest, becomes
small compared with the cost of accessing the CB￿ s lending facility. However, this implies
that agents cannot pledge collateral at the CB, and, therefore, cannot borrow. When we
compare the two frameworks at rates of in￿ ation that both can implement the Friedman rule,
we ￿nd that the framework using standing facilities achieves higher welfare. When i‘ > id,
standing facilities create a transfer from banks that access the lending facility to banks that
use the deposit facility. Such a transfer is absent when the CB conducts monetary policy
through OMOs, since the CB cannot discriminate between borrowers and depositors. Finally,
17The transcript of the testimony can be found at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/kohn20060301a.htm
29our results highlight the bene￿ts of using both OMOs and standing facilities to implement
monetary policy. They also suggest that CBs should pay interest on both required and excess
reserves.
7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of Equation (49)
We know that




















= npqs + nM + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ n)M ￿ ￿n￿y
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿y
0
= ￿(1 ￿ n)pq + (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ n))M + ￿(1 ￿ n)￿y
1






M+1 = M ￿ i‘(L) + idD + ￿; (58)























= M (1 + id) + (id ￿ i‘)￿(1 ￿ n)‘ + ￿; (62)
Therefore,







where ‘ = pq ￿ (M ￿ ￿y1).
7.1.1 Equilibrium with OMOs
Equilibrium and Proof of Proposition 2. Case in which ￿
1
b = 0, ￿
0














Since this equilibrium has the ￿rst best allocation as its ouctome, let us analyze whether it
exists. This equilibrium exists if there is a policy Y;Y 0 such that ￿ = ￿. Hence, using (22)
with ￿ = 0, we must have
￿ = 1 +
~ R
1 ￿ ￿












Set Y 0 < 0 and Y 0 = ￿Y ￿ ￿ (i.e., the CB buys bonds in the Treasury market but less than






















since we consider a stationary equilibrium, Y=M = Y0=M0. Setting Y0=M0 = 0, we get that



























the money stock is less than the lifetime discounted value of the CB￿ s stock of bonds.
31Case in which ￿
1
b > 0, ￿
0
m = 0 (or ￿1 > ￿ = ￿0) In this case, we have ￿ = ~ R + ￿,




Therefore, the return on bonds is as good as cash for an agent with " = 0 in the Treasury
market. By replacing the value for ￿ and ￿ in (22) and (23), we obtain
￿ = 1 +
~ R
(1 ￿ ￿)





= ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0(q) + n] + (1 ￿ ￿) (64)
We also need to check that ￿
1
b > 0, which gives us the restriction (if ￿ < 1)
￿ > ￿.
In this case, notice that the ￿rst best is only attainable for ￿ ! ￿. Since then the equilibrium
equations boil down to the one for the case in which ￿
1
b = 0 and ￿
0
m = 0.
Case in which ￿
1
b = 0, ￿
0







m > 0, we have ￿ = ￿=￿ < ~ R + ￿ so that holding bonds yield a higher return than
holding cash for those agents with " = 0. Replacing the above expression for ￿, we obtain
that this equilibrium exists only if
￿ > ￿.
Then replacing the value for ￿ and ￿ in (22) and (23), we obtain








= [(1 ￿ n)u
0(q) + n]
Comparing (23) with the equation above, observe that
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿ = (1￿n)u0(q)+n, so that
the bond return equals the yield on cash for agents with " = 1.
Given Y 0=M and Y=M, the ￿rst equation gives us ￿, and then we get q from the second.
An equilibrium with ￿
1
b = 0 exists for feasible Y 0=M and Y=M such that the above equation
holds if ￿ > ￿. The ￿rst best is clearly not attainable in this case, and the best equilibrium
allocation is achieved when ￿ ! ￿.
32Case in which ￿
1
b > 0, ￿
0
m > 0 (or ￿1 > ￿ > ￿0). In this case, both borrowing short-
selling constraints are binding such that y1 = ￿b and y0 = M=￿. By replacing these values
in the market clearing condition in the Treasury market, we obtain
￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿)M
(￿b ￿ Y )
Notice that this implies ￿ > Y=b. By replacing the value for ￿ and ￿ in (22) and (23) we
obtain
￿ = 1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)M
(￿b ￿ Y )
(Y + ￿Y 0)
M
￿ =
￿(b ￿ Y )
￿(b + Y 0) ￿ Y ￿ Y 0
￿ =
￿(1 ￿ Y0=b0)
￿(1 + Y 0






[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] = ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0(q) + n] +
~ R(￿b ￿ Y )
M
(65)
Given the initial conditions M0;B0 and policies, these two equations de￿ne an equilibrium.
We also need to check that ￿
0
m > 0, which gives us the restriction
￿ > 1 ￿
~ R(￿b ￿ Y )
(1 ￿ ￿)M
Finally, we need to check that ￿
1




~ R(￿b ￿ Y )
(1 ￿ ￿)M
:




M = 1. Then
the above restriction implies ￿ > 1=(1 ￿ ￿). Since ￿1 > ￿ and ￿=￿ = ￿￿1 +(1 ￿ ￿)￿, it must
be that ￿1 > 1, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Note that welfare is decreasing in ￿ in all four equilibriums. Therefore, the CB should
seek to implement ￿ = 1. It is easy to see that ￿ = 1 cannot be an equilibrium in the case
in which ￿1 = ￿ = ￿0 and ￿1 > ￿ = ￿0. Let us now consider the case in which ￿1 > ￿ > ￿0.
33In this case, we have ￿=￿ = 1=￿ = ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿. So that ￿1 > 1=￿: Finally, in the case
in which ￿1 = ￿ > ￿0, we have ￿1 = 1=￿. Therefore, this is the case the CB should aim for.
It is easy to see that the policy Y = ￿Y 0 (pure repos) implements ￿ = 1. The rest of the
proposition follows from the de￿nition of the equilibrium.
7.1.2 Channel System with No Lending Facility: Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 6.
Suppose there is a channel system that achieves the ￿rst best. Then since u0 (q￿) = 1, (40)




~ R + ￿
￿
, (66)




= ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)




Proof of Proposition 7.
It is easy to see that only ￿
0
m > 0 is an equilibrium, so that y0 = M=￿. Indeed, since ￿￿ = ￿,
we obtain ￿ (1 + id) = ￿, since ￿ = 1 + id. Hence, we always get that ~ R + ￿ > ￿ (1 + id) = ￿.
Therefore we need to consider only two types of equilibrium, one where ￿ > ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿) and
the other in which ￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿).
Case in which ￿
0
m > 0, ￿
1





and replacing this value and the expression for ￿ and ￿ = 1 + id in (51), we obtain
1
￿
= (1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n: (67)
This is an equilibrium only if y1 > ￿b, since ￿
1
b = 0. Using the Treasury market clearing







34Notice that b = ￿ B, since the CB does not hold any bonds. Replacing the value for ￿, we
obtain that ￿
0
m > 0, ￿
1
b = 0 is an equilibrium if and only if
￿ ~ R
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ B = ￿ ￿ B >
1 ￿ ￿
￿
M (1 + id):
(Multiplying both sides by ￿, we have an expression linking the real value of bonds on the
left side to the real value of cash multiplied by a constant on the right side.) Hence, for this
to be an equilibrium 1 + id should be low enough.
Case in which ￿
0
m > 0, ￿
1
b > 0 (￿1 > ￿ > ￿0) In this case, y0 = M=￿ and y1 = ￿b =














Replacing these values in (51), we obtain
1
￿
= ￿[(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n] + (1 ￿ ￿)
~ R + ￿
￿
: (68)
This is an equilibrium if and only if ￿ > ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿) and ( ~ R + ￿)=￿ > 1 + id. We know the









Hence, this equilibrium exists if 1 + id is large enough.
Notice that














Therefore using (68), we have
1
￿
< [(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n]
Comparing this with (67), we ￿nd that welfare is highest in the ￿rst equilibrium (where id is
relatively small). When id is too large, bonds are relatively unattractive and agents cannot
get many reserves for their bonds on the Treasury market.
357.1.3 Channel System with a Lending Facility (￿‘ > 0): Equilibrium
Suppose now ￿‘ > 0. In words, agents are constrained when they borrow from the CB. Then
‘ =
( ~ R + ￿)
(1 + i‘)
( ￿ B + y
1):
Since agents borrow from the CB, it must be that ￿
1
b = 0, so that they do not sell all their




( ~ R + ￿)
￿
￿









Consider now the case in which ￿
0







The budget constraint on the goods market gets us
pq = M ￿ ￿y








replacing y1 in the expression for ‘ above, we obtain
￿‘ =
( ~ R + ￿)
￿(1 + i‘)








￿ ￿M (1 + i‘) =
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
(￿￿￿ ￿ B ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿M￿)
Replacing this value in (49), we have an expression for ￿ (with ￿ = 0).
￿ = (1 ￿ n)(1 + i‘) + n(1 + id) ￿ (i‘ ￿ id)￿(1 ￿ n)q
1
￿M (1 + id)
Also, we have from (51)
1
￿




+ (1 ￿ ￿)













( ~ R + ￿)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
+ ￿n
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
:












( ~ R + ￿)
￿
+ n
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
= (1 + i‘)
(1 ￿ n)u0 (q) + n(1 + id)
(1 ￿ n)u0 (q)(1 + id) + n(1 + i‘)
Notice that
( ~ R+￿)
￿ < 1 + i‘, as required in equilibrium also,
( ~ R+￿)
￿ > 1 + id if and only if
1+i‘ > (1 + id)
2. Then the equilibrium in this case is de￿ned by ￿0;￿;q, and ￿ that satis￿es,
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
￿ = (1 + i‘)
(1 ￿ n)u0 (q) + n(1 + id)
(1 ￿ n)u0 (q)(1 + id) + n(1 + i‘)











= ￿(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + (1 ￿ ￿)
~ R + ￿
￿






￿ (1 + i‘) = ￿
￿￿ ￿ B
￿M
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
￿
Combining the second and the fourth equations, we get:
￿ =
1 + id ￿
(i‘￿id)







(1+i‘) (1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿)
( ~ R+￿)
￿
Consider now the case in which ￿
0
m = 0. Then
( ~ R + ￿)
￿
= 1 + id.
and since ￿
1
b = 0, we have
￿
￿
= (1 + id)
￿









￿ = (1 ￿ n)(1 + i‘) + n(1 + id) ￿ (i‘ ￿ id)￿(1 ￿ n)q
1
￿M (1 + id)
37Proof of Proposition 8:






such that from (40) ￿‘ = 0. In other words, agents are not constrained when they borrow from
the CB. Also, consider an equilibrium in which agents borrow from the CB. Then it must be
that they still hold bonds in the goods market, so that y1 > ￿b. Therefore, any equilibrium
in which agents borrow from the CB has ￿
1
b = 0. Combining (72) and (47), ￿
1
b = 0, if and
only if ￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿), or






Now consider the case in which ￿
0
m > 0. (46) implies that
~ R + ￿
￿
=
~ R + ￿
￿
￿ > 1 + id
Combining both equations above, we obtain
1 + id > ￿ > ￿ (1 + id): (74)




= [(1 ￿ n)u
0 (q) + n](1 + id) (75)
Notice that (74) and (75) give us the desired result.
We now check that this equilibrium exists. Replacing u0 (q) using (72),
￿
￿
= (1 ￿ n)(1 + i‘) + n(1 + id) (76)
Using (49) and (76) we get
1 + id + (id ￿ i‘)￿(1 ￿ n)
‘
M
= ￿ (1 + id) + (1 ￿ n)￿ (i‘ ￿ id)










(i‘ ￿ id)(1 ￿ n)
38Finally to check that this is indeed an equilibrium, we need to verify that (using the budget





￿ ￿ B + y1￿
M
( ~ R + ￿)
(1 + i‘)
(77)
where y1 = ￿
(1￿￿)
￿ y0 = ￿
(1￿￿)
￿ M=￿. Focusing on the ￿rst inequality and replacing the value




(i‘ ￿ id)(1 ￿ n)
> 1, or
1 ￿ ￿n






















￿ (1 + i‘)
(78)
where ￿￿ ￿ B is the real price of bonds (a constant) and ￿M is the real price of reserves, also a
constant. Notice that for all ￿ B and M, this inequality puts a limit as to how close i‘ can be
to id, i.e., on the size of the interest rate channel. In other words, if the lending rate is too
close to the deposit rate, borowing is relatively cheap and consumers will want to borrow too
much from the CB. To reduce borrowing, the CB must increase i‘.
Replacing ‘ in the budget constraint on the goods market and p￿(1 + id) = 1 gives us
￿M, as
pq = M ￿ y












(1+id)2q, we know that ￿0 = 1, and since ￿0 = ￿ ~ R0=(1 ￿ ￿), we
can pick ￿ B0 high enough, so that the above (78) is satis￿ed.
397.2 Open Market Operations in the Goods Market
In this section, we consider the model in which the Treasury market is open in the goods
market, once preference shocks are realized and before trades actually take place.
In the settlement stage, the problem of an agent with portfolio (m;b) is now:
V (m;b) = max
h;m+;b+
￿h + ￿W (m+;b+)
s:t: ￿m+ + ￿￿b+ = h + ￿(m ￿ T) + ￿
￿
￿ + ~ R
￿
b + ￿￿:
Notice that the value of the portfolio (m+;b+) is now directly evaluated in the goods market:
Since the Treasury market is open in the goods market, we can simply assume that agents
wait for the realization of their shock and ignore their signals before trading their Treasury
securities. Using the budget constraint to eliminate h in the objective function, one obtains
the ￿rst-order conditions
￿Wm+ = ￿; (79)
￿Wb+ ￿ ￿￿( = if b+ > 0); (80)
The envelope conditions are
Vm = ￿ and Vb = ￿
￿




When they enter the goods market, agents can be either consumers or producers. An agent
who received shock " = 1 need reserves with probability 1 ￿ n and does not need any with
probability n. An agent who received shock " = 0 has no need for reserves. In general, the
expected payo⁄ of an agent with shock " and portfolio (m;b) is
W
" (m;b) = (1 ￿ n)W
";c (m;b) + nW
";p (m;b): (82)
Let q and q"
p denote the quantities consumed and produced in the goods market by agents
who received shock ", respectively (only those agents with " = 1 consume, and q denotes their






















40Since securities have to be exchanged before goods are traded, the sales pq"
p do not enter the
short-selling constraints. Since producers have no need for cash, their securities short-selling
constraint does not bind, ￿￿b = 0, and the ￿rst-order conditions are
p￿ = 1
￿￿Vm + Vb = ￿￿
"
m
where ￿￿m is the real multiplier on the cash short-selling constraint. Using the envelope
conditions (81), we obtain ￿
~ R + ￿
￿





m > 0 so that y"
p = m
￿ if ~ R + ￿ > ￿. In other words, agents who do not need
reserves buy as many Treasury bills as possible if they are cheap relative to their return. The
envelope conditions are then
W
";p









b = Vb = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
For those agents who do not need reserves, the incremental value of cash is the value of
purchasing Treasury bills, while the incremental value of Treasury bills is just their real
return on the next settlement stage.















As these agents have no need for cash, the short-selling constraint on treasuries will not bind.
The ￿rst order and envelope conditions then give
￿
~ R + ￿
￿














~ R + ￿
￿





u(q) + V (m ￿ ￿y
1
c ￿ pq;b + y
1
c)





pq ￿ m ￿ ￿y
1
c
Since these agents need reserves, the short-selling constraint on reserves will never bind and
the ￿rst-order conditions are
u
0 (q) ￿ pVm ￿ ￿p￿ = 0
￿￿Vm + Vb + ￿￿
1
b ￿ ￿￿￿ = 0











~ R + ￿
￿
=￿ ￿ 1 + ￿
1
b=￿
Consumers equalize the marginal utility of reserves to the marginal value of a Treasury se-
curity. Whenever their short-selling constraint is binding, reserves have more value than a
security alone. This is the case (i.e., y1
c = ￿b) if u0 (q) >
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿. The envelope conditions
for these agents are
W
1;c
m = Vm + ￿￿ = ￿
￿
















The incremental value of reserves is again the value of purchasing Treasury bills. However,
Treasury bills are more valuable for " = 1 agents, since they can be sold to relax their cash
constraint.
Independently of the shock received, the value of a portfolio (m;b) for an agent that enters
the goods market is therefore
W (m;b) = ￿
￿
nW






0;p (m;b) + (1 ￿ n)W
0;c (m;b)
￿
42so that we obtain the envelope conditions
Wm = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
￿












~ R + ￿
￿















~ R + ￿
￿
￿










and the no arbitrage condition ￿ ￿ ￿+ with equality if b > 0. Using our stationarity assump-
tions ￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿, we get
￿ ￿ ￿￿ with = if b > 0.
We will still assume that q1
p = q0
p = qp, where market clearing requires qp = (1 ￿ n)￿q=n. The
other equilibrium condition (22) (obtained from combining (1) and (6)) are still valid and are
determined as before. Therefore, we can de￿ne an equilibrium with OMOs in the goods stage
as follows.
De￿nition 10 Given the CB policy (￿;B;Y=M;Y 0=M), a symmetric stationary equilibrium
is a list (￿;q;￿;￿) that solves













~ R + ￿
￿
￿
















p = yp =
m
￿
if ~ R + ￿ > ￿
y
1
c = ￿b if u
0 (q) >
￿












43Let us suppose once again that the CB has to redistribute its pro￿t from OMOs, or ￿ ￿ 1.
Then the best-case scenario is that consumers are not constrained on the goods market, so
that u0 (q) =
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿. In this case, the best equilibrium is ￿ = 1 so that ￿ = ￿. Then
bonds are priced at their fair value since we have
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿ = 1=￿
￿ = ￿ ~ R=(1 ￿ ￿)
Notice that, in this case u0 (q) = 1=￿. This is the best allocation that can be achieved when
the CB conducts OMOs in the goods market.
Proposition 11 Suppose the CB makes no pro￿t, then ￿ = 1 and the best equilibrium allo-
cation with OMOs in the goods market satis￿es
u
0 (q) = 1=￿
In this equilibrium, notice that OMOs can perfectly insure agents against their liquidity
shock since they all value cash at 1=￿. However, OMOs has little control over the in￿ ation
rate which remains at ￿ = 1.
7.2.2 Standing Facilities
We now derive the equilibrium conditions when the CB does not conduct OMOs but o⁄ers
standing facilities instead. The Treasury market is still open in the goods market.
When they enter the goods market, agents can be either short or long of reserves. An
agent who received shock " = 1 has a high need for reserves with probability 1 ￿ n and a
low need for reserves with probability n. An agent who received shock " = 0 has no need for
reserves. The expected payo⁄ of an agent " and portfolio (m;b) is
W
" (m;b) = (1 ￿ n)W
";c (m;b) + nW
";p (m;b):
Let q and q"
p denote the quantities consumed and produced in the goods market by agents
who received shock ", respectively (only those agents with " = 1 consume, and q denotes their



























44where we have already taken into account that producers do not borrow at the CB. As
producers have no need for cash, their short-selling constraint on securities does not bind,
￿￿b = 0, and the ￿rst-order conditions are
￿1 + pVm + p￿￿
"
d = 0










m is the multiplier on the cash short-selling constraint and ￿￿
"
d is the multiplier on
the deposit constraint. Using the envelope conditions on the settlement stage, Vd = ￿(1 + id)
we obtain
p￿(1 + id) = 1
￿
~ R + ￿
￿








m > 0 so that y"
p = m
￿ if ~ R+￿ > ￿ (1 + id). In other words, agents who are long in
reserves buy as many bonds as possible if the bond return is higher than the deposit rates on
reserves. Also, the shadow price of reserves ￿
"















b = Vb = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿





V (m ￿ ￿y
0
c ￿ d;b + y
0
c;0;d)





d ￿ m ￿ ￿y
0
c
As these agents are long in reserves, the short-selling constraint on securities will not bind.
The ￿rst order and envelope conditions then give
￿
~ R + ￿
￿

















~ R + ￿
￿
45Hence, once again y0






u(q) + V (m ￿ ￿y
1
c + ‘ ￿ pq;b + y
1
c;‘;0)














~ R + ￿
￿
=(1 + i‘)
where we have taken into account that in equilibrium, these agents do not use the deposit
facility. Since these agents need reserves, their short-selling constraint will never bind and
the ￿rst order conditions are
u
0 (q) ￿ pVm ￿ ￿p￿ = 0
￿￿Vm + Vb + ￿￿
1
b ￿ ￿￿￿ + ￿￿‘
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=(1 + i‘) = 0
Vm + V‘ + ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿‘ = 0




















￿ = ￿‘ + i‘
Agents who need reserves equalize the marginal utility of reserves to the marginal value of a
Treasury security. Whenever their short-selling constraint is binding (￿
1
b > 0), they will have
no more bonds in the goods stage, and, therefore, they will not be able to borrow at the CB.
In this case ￿‘ > 0. This is the case (y1
c = ￿b) if 1 + i‘ >
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿, i.e., borrowing at the




m = Vm + ￿￿ = ￿
￿











~ R + ￿
￿
=(1 + i‘)
= ￿Vm + ￿￿￿ = ￿
￿





46The value of a portfolio (m;b) for an agent that enters the goods market is, therefore,
W (m;b) = ￿
￿
nW






0;p (m;b) + (1 ￿ n)W
0;c (m;b)
￿
so that we obtain the envelope conditions
Wm = ￿
￿
~ R + ￿
￿
￿
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as well as the no arbitrage condition ￿ ￿ ￿+ with equality if b > 0. Using the stationarity
assumptions ￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿; we get
￿ ￿ ￿￿ with = if b > 0
We will still assume that q1
p = q0
p = qp, where market clearing requires qp = (1 ￿ n)￿q=n.
The money supply still evolves according to
￿ = 1 + id + (id ￿ i‘)￿(1 ￿ n)‘=M
An equilibrium with a standing facility is, therefore, characterized by the following equations
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Proposition 12 There is an equilibrium with a standing facility such that the allocation qs
satis￿es u0 (qs) < 1=￿.
Proof. The best equilibrium with a standing facility is when consumers are not constrained
at the lending facility, i.e., ￿‘ = 0 while still borrowing at the CB. This requires that they
still have bonds to pledge as collateral, so that y1
c > ￿b, or ￿
1
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The in￿ ation rate is, therefore, ￿ = ￿ (1 + i‘). We obtain from (85) that ￿ ￿ 1 + id (with







with strict inequality if there is borrowing at the CB. Combining (88) and (89) we obtain the
result whenever ‘ > 0 and i‘ > id. We now show that such an equilibrium exists.
Since
￿
~ R + ￿
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=￿ > 1 + id, we get y"
p = y0
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Since all the cash in the economy is in the hands of consumers, this implies that they borrow
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where we have used
￿
~ R + ￿
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￿ ￿M ￿ ￿ B￿￿
which implies a high enough deposit rates. ￿M is given by (85) once we replace for ￿‘

























where ￿ = (1 + i‘)=(1 + id) and where q is given by (88). Since ￿ > 1, we get that ￿M > 0.













which is satis￿ed. This completes the proof.
Notice that, in the equilibrium in the proof, all agents value cash in the same way so that
once again the channel policy insures agents against their liquidity shock. Since consumers
are not constraint, ￿
1
b = 0 and from the envelope condition, all agents cash valuation is ￿
~ R + ￿
￿
=￿. And as before, the di⁄erence between the deposit and the lending rates explain
why the CB can achieve the allocation qs. If we now combine (11) and (12), we obtain that
even if OMOs take place once the shocks are realized, it is better to use the channel system
than OMOs, given a level of in￿ ation that is implementable using both systems. Therefore,
the result in the main body of the paper is robust to a change in the timing of OMOs.
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